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Abstract. The Internet of Things (IoT) is a paradigm that can tremen-
dously revolutionize health care thus benefiting both hospitals, doctors
and patients. In this context, protecting the IoT in health care against in-
terference, including service attacks and malwares, is challenging. Opac-
ity is a confidentiality property capturing a system’s ability to keep a
subset of its behavior hidden from passive observers. In this work, we
seek to introduce an IoT-based heart attack detection system, that could
be life-saving for patients without risking their need for privacy through
the verification and enforcement of opacity. Our main contributions are
the use of a tool to verify opacity in three of its forms, so as to detect pri-
vacy leaks in our system. Furthermore, we develop an efficient, Symbolic
Observation Graph (SOG)-based algorithm for enforcing opacity.
1 Introduction
Real-world usage of IoT in health-care necessitates the dealing with new security
challenges. In fact, and since this type of application would handle medical and
personal information, their employment carries serious risks for personal privacy.
Accordingly, it is paramount to protect any sensitive data against recovery or de-
duction by third-parties to avoid the compromise of individual privacy. The most
common security preservation practice is the use of cryptographic techniques.
However, cryptographic protocols do not provide perfect security as the inference
of critical information from non-critical ones remains a possibility. Indeed, the
discovery of vulnerabilities of simple crypto-systems like that of the Needham-
Schroeder public key protocol [11] proved that cryptography is not enough to
guarantee the privacy of information. Furthermore, the various techniques avail-
able are computationally intensive. This is why they cannot be immediately
adopted in IoT where the network nodes are powered by battery. To facilitate
the adoption of IoT in health-care, we need formal (preferably automated) verifi-
cation of security properties. Formal verification entails the use of mathematical
techniques to ensure that the system’s design conforms to the desired behav-
ior. Information flow properties are the most formal security properties. In fact,
various ones have been defined in the literature including non-interference [8],
intransitive non-interference [9] and others (e.g. secrecy, and anonymity). Inter-
ested in confidentiality properties, we consider opacity, a general information
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flow property, to analyze IoT privacy in a heart attack detection system. Opac-
ity’s main interest is to formulate the need to hide information from a passive
observer. It was first introduced in [13] and was later generalized to transition
systems [3]. It has since, been studied several times allowing the formal verifica-
tion of system models (usually given as non deterministic automata or labeled
transition systems). Its wide study led to the birth of several definitions (vari-
ants) as well as verification and enforcement techniques. If classified according
to the security policy, then we are dealing with simple, K-step, initial, infinite as
well as strong and weak opacity alongside their extensions (e.g, K-step weak and
K-step strong opacity). The efforts of these studies also made possible not only
opacity verification, but also its assurance via supervision [5], [15] or enforcement
[7]. A key limitation of these studies is that they have been very theoretical in
the way they have approached and applied opacity.
In this paper, we wish to bridge the gap between the theory of opacity and its
practical application through the synthesis of an opaque IoT-based heart attack
detection system. Building on the SOG-based verification approach developed
in [2], the purpose is to verify opacity in three of its forms (simple, K-step
weak opacity and K-step strong opacity) to detect security violations in our
synthesized system. Then to contribute an algorithmic approach that enforces
simple opacity by padding the system with minimal dummy behavior.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes all necessary basic
notions including the SOG structure and the opacity property. In Section 3, we
detail the case study. In Section 4, we illustrate the practical usefulness of the
opacity verification approach in the heart attack detection system. Section 5
details our proposed approach to enforce simple opacity. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6, and list some potential future works.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, the following notions are used to introduce our proposed
approach. Let Σ be a finite alphabet.
– Σ∗: is the set of all finite words over Σ, comprising the empty word ε;
– L ⊆ Σ∗: L the language defined on Σ∗.
The sequence u is a prefix of v ∈ Σ∗, denoted by u ≺ v, if ∃w s.t u · w = v. We note
v − u = w.
2.1 Petri nets, WF-net and oWF-nets
To model the services under consideration in our case study, we use Petri nets. A service
can be considered as a control structure describing its behavior in order to reach a final
state. We can represent it using a Workflow net, a subclass of Petri nets. A WF-net
satisfies two requirements: it has one input place i and one output place o, and every
transition t or place p should be located on a path from place i to place o. To model
the communication aspect of a service, we can use another variant of Petri nets called
open Work-Flow nets which is enriched with communication places representing the
(asynchronous) interface. Each communication place represents a channel to send or
receive messages to or from another oWF-net.
Definition 1 (oWF-net [12]).
An open Work-Flow net is defined by a tuple N = (P, T, F,W,m0, I, O,mf ):
– (P, T, F,W ) is a WF-net;
• P is a finite set of places and T a finite set of transitions;
• F is a flow relation F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P );
• W : F → N is a mapping allocating a weight to each arc.
– m0 is the initial marking;
– I is a set of input places and O is a set of output places (I ∪O: the set of interface
places).
– mf is a final marking.
Having the same semantics as Petri nets, the behavior of WF-nets and oWF-nets can
be represented by Labeled Transition Systems (LTS), a more general model than the
reachability graph.
2.2 Labeled Transition System
An LTS is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Labeled Transition System).
A Labeled Transition System is a 4-tuple G = (Q, qinit, Σ, δ):
– Q : a finite set of states;
– qinit : the initial state;
– Σ : actions’ alphabet;
– δ : Q × Σ → Q : the transition function where: q, q′ ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ, δ(q, σ) = q′
meaning that an event σ can be executed at state q leading to state q′.
The language of an LTS G is defined by L(G) = {t ∈ Σ∗, q0 t−→ qf}. An LTS can be
considered as an automaton where all states are accepting final states. Therefore, the
language accepted by the LTS is prefix-closed.
To reflect the observable behavior of an LTS, we specify a subset of events Σo ⊆ Σ
and Σ−Σo = Σu where Σo is the set of events visible to a given observer and Σu is the
set of events which are invisible to said-observer. The behavior visible by an observer
is defined by the projection PΣo from Σ
∗ to Σ∗o that removes from a sequence in Σ
∗
all events not in Σo. Formally, Po: Σ
∗ → Σ∗o is defined s.t.:
PΣo() = ;
PΣo(u · σ) =
{
PΣo(u) if σ /∈ Σo;
PΣo(u) · σ otherwise.
Where: σ ∈ Σ and u ∈ Σ∗.
2.3 Opacity
Opacity’s main interest is in capturing the possibility of using observations and prior-
knowledge of a system’s structure to infer secret information. It reflects a wide range of
security properties. Opacity’s parameters are a secret predicate, given as a subset of sets
or traces of the system’s model, and an observation function. This latter captures an
intruder’s abilities to collect information about the system. A system is, thus, opaque
w.r.t. the secret and the observation function, if and only if for every run that belongs
to the secret, there exists another run with a similar projection from the observer’s
point of view and that does not belong to the secret [5, 6, 10]. In this paper, we focus
on 3 opacity variants as defined by the authors in [6]: simple, K-step weak and K-step
strong opacity.
Definition 3 (Simple opacity [6]).
Given an LTS G = (Q, q0, Σ, δ) with Σo ⊆ Σ is the set of observable events and S ⊆ Q
is the set of secret states. The secret S ⊆ Q is opaque under the projection map PΣo
ou (G,PΣo)− opaque iff: ∀u ∈ LS(G),∃v ∈ L(G) : (v ≈Σo u) ∧ (v /∈ LS(G)).
While simple opacity deals with the non-discloser of the fact that the system is
currently in a secret state, K-step opacity deals with the non-discloser of the fact that
the system was in a secret state in the past. K-step weak opacity ensures that the
system wasn’t in a secret state K observable events ago, while K-step strong opacity
formulates the need to make sure that, K-steps backwards, the system does not end,
and have not crossed any secret states.
2.4 Symbolic Observation Graph
The SOG is an abstraction of the reachability graph. It is constructed by exploring a
system’s observable actions which are used to label its edges. The unobservable actions
are hidden within the SOG nodes named aggregates. Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)
[4] are used to represent and efficiently manage the SOG nodes. The definition of an
aggregate and that of the SOG are given in the following:
Definition 4 (Aggregate).
Given an LTS G = (Q, q0, Σ,→, δ) with Σ = Σo ∪Σu. An aggregate a is a non empty
set of states satisfying: q ∈ a⇔ Saturate(q) ⊆ a where: Saturate(q) = {q′ ∈ Q : q w−→
q′and w ∈ Σ∗u}.
Definition 5 (Deterministic SOG).
A deterministic SOG(A) associated with an LTS G = (Q, q0, Σo ∪ Σu, δ) is an LTS
(A, a0, Σo,∆) where:
1. A a finite set of aggregates with:
(a) a0 ∈ A is the initial aggregate s.t. a0 = Saturate(q0);
(b) For each a ∈ A, and for each σ ∈ Σo, ∃q ∈ a, q′ ∈ Q : q σ−→ q′ ⇔ ∃a′ ∈ A :
a′ = Saturate({q′ ∈ Q,∃q ∈ a with q σ−→ q′}) ∧ (a, σ, a′) ∈ ∆;
2. ∆ ⊆ A×Σo ×A is the transition relation.
The SOG allows the on-the-fly-verification of opacity variants: simple, K-step weak
and K-step strong opacity [2]. It also allows the detection of cases of opacity violation.
3 Motivating Scenario
Heart disease is the first cause of morbidity and mortality in the world, accounting
for 28.30% of total deaths each year in Tunisia alone [14]. Investment in preventive
health care such as the use of IoT monitoring devices and tools may help lower the
cost of processing and the development of serious health problems. In fact, integrating
clinical decisions with electronic medical records could decrease medical errors, reduce
undesirable variations in practice, and improve patient outcomes.
Our case study considers IoT integration with cloud computing. We use a connected
bracelet, fog nodes, a private and a public Cloud, and a mobile application, which
together form a medical application. This latter provides continuous monitoring of the
vital data of a given patient. Regular or routine measurements could help to detect
the first symptoms of heart malfunction, and makes it possible to immediately trigger
an alert. The vital information collected by the bracelet worn by the patient includes
cardiac activity, blood pressure, oxygen levels and, temperature. As mentioned earlier,
we consider an IoT application in a hybrid cloud/fog environment. The cloud [17] is
considered as a highly promising approach to deliver services to users, and provide
applications with low-cost elastic resources. Given the fact that IoT suffers limited
computational power, storage capacity and bandwidth, cloud computing ease the issues
in enabling the access, the storage, and the processing of the large amount of generated
data.
Public clouds provide cheap scalable resources. Making it useful for analyzing the
patient’s vital data which would be costly as it requires extensive computing and
storage resources. However, we must take into account that storage of health records
on a public environment is a privacy risk. To avoid such security leaks, we could deploy
the application on a secure private cloud. But seeing this latter’s limited resources, this
may degrade the overall performance. To prevent this, the workflow can be partitioned
between a private cloud and a public one. Therefore, the confidential medical data
will be processed on the private cloud. Other workflow actions can be deployed on the
public cloud dealing with anonymized data.
The use of a cloud-based framework poses the problem of delay when sending and
receiving data between the objects and geographically far cloud resources thus jeop-
ardizing the patients’ well-being given that triggering timely responses is the purpose
of this data. To resolve this issue, data gathering can be moved from the cloud do-
main to that of the fog [1]. Bringing this action closer to the connected object shortens
the transmission time, and reduces the amount of data transferred to the cloud. The
proposed workflow is described as follows:
– A patient may register via the mobile app by entering his information. This in-
formation include personal data and medical history (personal and family medical
histories, surgical history, drug prescriptions, and the doctors’ notes).
– The patient’s medical history is then transmitted to the private cloud. After re-
ception, this latter anonymizes the data by stripping off all that could identify the
patient leaving only medical data, which it sends to the public cloud.
– The public cloud receives the anonymized data, and proceeds to the classification
attaching to each medical file a class.
– The patient is equipped with a measuring bracelet connected to the processing
components (Fog nodes). The data sent to the fog domain is a set of vital data
recorded over a period of time.
– The fog node collects the data then compares it to its predecessors, searching for
any vital signs changes. When the node determines that a change has occurred, it
sends the data to the private cloud.
– The private cloud links the gathered data with the patient, transmitting this data
and the class ascribed to the patient, to the public cloud.
– The public cloud reads the data, analyzes it, and then provides results. When the
risk of heart attack is detected, it immediately notifies the patient’s app.
4 Modeling and Verification
The case study contains five services, namely, a connected bracelet (Br), a fog node
(Fog), a private cloud (CPr), a public cloud (CPub), and a smartphone application
(App). Figure 1 depicts the oWF-nets of the Br, Fog, CPr, CPub and the App, respec-
tively. We note that the transitions entailing the sending (respectively reception) of a
messages are indicated by adding a ! (respectively a ?) mark. In this case study we
want to illustrate the ability of the SOG-based verification approach to meet privacy
demands. The first step is to create the underlying LTS of each oWf-net. Secondly,
we identify the observable and unobservable actions of each net as well as the secret
states. Then, we build the SOG models from each nets LTS using the data from the
previous step verifying, at the same time, their opacity.
The Br workflow (Figure 1(a)) starts by collecting data (T1) through the sensors
mounted in the bracelet, which will then be sent to the closest Fog node. Next it creates
the message comprising the data (T2) and sends this message (T3?). Not having any
security requirements for the bracelet, thus, there is no need to check its opacity.
The Fog WS (Figure 1(b)) has an internal set of operations, and a set of external
cooperative ones. The second set concerns the exchanges of the fog with the Br, the
CPr and the App. After receiving the data (T1!), we consider two scenarios. The first is
when the Fog communicates for the 1st time with the bracelet (T3). In this case, it sends
a request (T5?) to the App to retrieve data from the patient’s medical history. Then, it
will receive these data through (T6!). The second scenario begins by selecting the last
recorded data (T4). The next step is to compare (T7) the data retrieved by one of the
mentioned scenarios with the data sent by the Br. When the node detects a change in
values (T9), it will immediately transmit the data to CPr (T10?). If there is no change
(T8), the Fog doesn’t perform any processing. Finally, the new data will be stored locally
in the Fog (T11). To ensure the privacy of fog secret information, we define the secret
state S = {S6} which is related to receiving patient’s medical history. To conform with
the security needs, the observable transitions of the Fog are Σo = {T1!, T5?, T6!, T10?},
while the unobservable part is Σu = {T2, T3, T4, T7, T8, T9, T11}. Using this data, and
after creating the LTS, we proceed to the opacity verification which is done on-the-y,
while creating the SOG-abstraction of the model. We get the SOG in Figure 2(a) and
we note that we have a single secret state belonging to an aggregate which holds other,
non secret, states. We can conclude, then that the fog’s SOG is both simple, and K-step
weakly and strongly opaque.
The CPr worflow (Figure 1(c)) contains two scenarios. The first one starts by re-
ceiving the data of a new registered patient (T1!). The CPr subsequently proceeds with
the recording (T2) and the anonymization (T3) of the received data. The anonymised
data will then be transmitted to the CPub (T4?). After receiving (T5!) the class, this
latter is associated with the patient (T6). The second scenario starts when the CPr
receives (T7!) the data sent by the Fog. The CPr combines the data with the patient
by searching for its unique identifier (ID)(T8). If the ID cannot be found (T9), the
CPr sends a request to the App so that the patient re-enter his personal information
(T10?). Thereafter, it receives the requested data (T11!) and it pursues the first sce-
nario. For the second case, when the ID is found, the CPr transmits the data and the
class to which the patient belongs to the CPub (T13?). Afterwards, the CPr receives
and records respectively 3 types of messages, each one belongs to an alert type: low
(T14! & T15), medium (T16! & T17) and high (T19! & T20). To protect the privacy
of individual patients, the CPr need to hide the update procedure performed on the
patient’s personal information. It must keep secret the states related to the new pa-
tient registration (S4 & S16) and the anonymization of his data (S7 & S21). It is also
required to withhold secret the states related to sending alerts when the symptoms
of a heart attack are detected (S22 & S23). So the set of secret states for the CPr
is S = {S1, S3, S4, S7, S16, S21, S22, S23}, where S1 stands for the marking related to
the reception of the data sent by the fog, while S3 reflects that related to patient
ID search. To conform with these needs, the observable transitions of the CPr are
(a) Bracelet
oWF-net.
(b) Fog oWF-net.
(c) Private cloud oWF-net.
(d) Public cloud oWF-net.
(e) Application oWF-net.S
Fig. 1. Case Study oWF-nets.
Σo = {T1!, T4?, T5!, T7!, T10?, T11!, T13?, T14!, T16!, T18?, T19!, T21?}, while the unobserv-
able ones are Σu = {T2, T3, T6, T8, T9, T12, T15, T17, T20}. With this configuration, we
conduct the opacity verification and get the SOG in Figure 2(b). Thus, the CPr work-
flow is not opaque and is not k-step weakly and strongly opaque. Indeed, the two secret
states S22 and S23, each belonging to an aggregate that doesn’t hold other non-secret
states. An attacker can then disclose secret information after the traces T7T13T16T18
and T7T13T19T21. The CPr service is therefore unsafe and needs to be improved to
adapt it to handle private data. Taking into account that the public cloud is available
(a) The SOG of the Fog Node.
(b) The SOG of the Private Cloud.
(c) The SOG of the Mobile Applica-
tion.
Fig. 2. The SOGs of the Case Study WSs.
for public use, we don’t have secrets to be hidden from an external observer. So, in the
following, we will only describe the CPub actions (Figure 1(d)) and we won’t proceed
the opacity verification. The first set of CPub operations concerns the internal opera-
tions which include the processing of the data sent by the CPr: the classification (T2)
and the prediction (T5) which in our case aims to detect the risk of heart attack. As
regards the external operations, the CPub receives two messages from the CPr. The
first one (T1) includes the anonymised data and the second (T4) includes the data col-
lected by the Br and the class to which the patient belongs. In response to the received
messages, the CPub sends the classification result to the CPr (T3) and sends 3 types
of alerts according to the results obtained from the prediction: T6 for the low alert, (T7
for the medium alert and T8 for the high alert.
The last service is that of the App (Figure 1(e)). The set of internal operations of
the App consists of two actions. The first action concerns the notification (T9) through
which the application warns the patient. The second concerns the application to register
(T1) which allows a new patient to deposit his information. After registration, the
provided information will be sent (T2) to the CPr. The App shares patient information
with the Fog (T3! & T4?) when this latter communicates for the first time with the Br.
It also shares the medical history with the CPr (T5! & T6) when it fails to find the
patient ID. At the end, the App receives two types of alerts (T7? for the medium alert
and T8? for the high alert) when the risk of a heart attack is detected. The App must be
opaque to both sides of the communication with regards to its set of secret states when
dealing with either the CPr or the Fog. To match these needs the observable transitions
of the App is Σo = {T2?, T3!, T4?, T5!, T6?, T7!, T8!}, while the unobservable ones are
Σu = {T1, T9}. Moreover, the set of secret states are S = {S2, S6, S7, S9, S10, S11},
with S2 is the marking related to the request to register of a new patient, S6 is that
related to the sending of patient data, S7 is that triggered due to the sending of
personal information of a new patient, S11 is related to the sending of medical history,
and finally S9 and S10 reflect the secrets associated with sending the notification to
warn the patient. Conducting the opacity verification for the App, we obtain the SOG
depicted in Figure 2(c). We say that the App SOG is not opaque according to Definition
3. Consequently it is not K-step weakly, and strongly opaque.
5 SOG-based Enforcement of Opacity
In this section, we describe the opacity enforcement problem introducing algorithms
to secure the heart attack detection system. Considering a language L and a secret
language L(ϕ) ∈ L, when opacity fails of a secret ϕ for a finite system S, we provide
an effective method to synthesize automatically a system S′ obtained by minimally
modifying the system S so that the secret ϕ is opaque for S′. To synthesize S′, we focus
on language modification. If a secret language L(ϕ) is not opaque for a system behavior
described by the language L(S), we can modify the behavior by padding it with dummy
behaviors. We can then extend the language by computing a minimal super-language
of L. In [16], the author has derived an algorithm to compute min
∏ϕ
super to assist the
designer develop a system that satisfies the opacity property for a secret language.
Theorem 1. [16] Let a language L defined on an alphabet Σ = Σo ∪Σu and a static
projection piO defined above on the same alphabet and a secret ϕ ⊆ L, then:
min
∏ϕ
super(L) = L ∪ (pio(ϕ)\(pio(ϕ) ∩ pio(L\ϕ)))
The proposed approach builds upon the SOG structure to check the system’s opac-
ity. If the system is not opaque, the SOG construction allows for detection of all opacity
violations provided as a counterexample. These counterexamples will later be used to
improve the system security (opacity) by locating the paths leading to the disclosure
of private information and performing necessary changes that would render it opaque.
Then we compute the minimal super-language that provides us with the restricted lan-
guage to be added in order to modify the system behavior. For each incident of opacity
violation, we match a trace among the calculated super-language and an unobservable
event will be added to this trace. In order to opacify the system, we apply the back-
tracking method. We implement adjustments where needed to the SOG and the LTS
and we thus return to the starting model, the Petri net.
5.1 The SOG-based Algorithm for the Verification of Simple
Opacity
The use of SOG-based algorithm in the verification of simple opacity proved efficient
[2]. This is due to the symbolic representation of the aggregates (employing BDDs),
and to the on-the-fly verification (Opacity is verified while constructing the SOG).
The SOG construction is stopped when the property is proven unsatisfied and a trace
(counterexample) that violates the opacity is supplied. To adopt this algorithm for our
enforcement approach, we will bring necessary modifications to it.
Algorithm 1: SOG-based Opaci-
fication
Procedure: SOG-based Opacification
((P, T, F,W ),mo,mS , Σo ∪
Σu)
1 Vertices V ; Edges E;
2 Aggregate a, a′;
3 Stack st, CounterExample;
4 Incidence Matrix C;
5 begin
6 (Q, qinit, Σ, δ)←
BuildReachabilityGraph(P, T, F,W,mo);
7 S ← mS ;
8 a← Saturate({qinit});
9 if (a ⊆ S) then
10 CounterExample.Push(, a, , a);
11 end
12 V ← a;E ← ∅;
13 trace← ∅;
14 st.push ((a,EnableObs(a)));
15 while (st 6= ∅) do
16 (a, enb)← st.Top();
17 if (enb 6= ∅) then
18 st.Pop();
19 else
20 t←
RemoveLast(st.Top.Second());
21 a′ ← Img(a, t);
22 a′ ← Saturate(a′);
23 if (Treated(a’)) then
24 E ← E ∪ t;
25 Save(a
t−→ a′);
26 else
27 if (a′ ⊆ S) then
28 Trace = Print
CounterExample();
29 CounterExample.
Push(trace, a, t, a′);
30 end
31 V ← V ∪ {a′};
32 E ← E ∪ t;
33 Save(a
t−→ a′);
34 st.Push(a′, EnableObs(a′));
35 end
36 end
37 end
38 if (CounterExample 6= ∅) then
39 Opacification();
40 end
41 end
Algorithm 2: Opacification
Procedure: Opacification()
1 begin
2 minSL = ComputationMinSL(L();
3 while (CounterExample 6= ∅) do
4 (trace, a, t, a′)←
CounterExample.Top();
5 if (NotTreated(a′)) then
6 foreach u in minSL do
7 if (u = trace) then
/* SOG
Opacification */
8 qnew =
new State();
9 a′ ← a′ ∪ {qnew};
10 Save(a
t−→ a′);
/* LTS
Opacification */
11 q ←
CounterExample.Top.Fourth();
12 tnew ←
new UnobservableTransition();
13 Q← Q ∪ qnew;
14 Σu ← Σu ∪ tnew;
15 δ(q, tnew) = qnew;
/* Petri net
Opacification */
16 pnew ←
newPlace();
17 P ← P ∪ pnew;
18 T ← T ∪ tnew;
19 p← getPlace();
20 F ← F ∪ (p, tnew);
21 F ←
F ∪ (tnew, pnew);
22 W ←
W∪{((p, tnew) 7−→
1), ((tnew, pnew) 7−→
1)};
23 C(pnew, tnew)←
W (tnew, pnew)−
W (pnew,tnew );
24 end
25 end
26 end
27 CounterExample.Pop();
28 end
29 end
The verification is performed on LTS-modeled systems. Taking into account that
we are trying to opacify Petri nets, the first modification needed to the algorithm
presented in [2] consists in replacing the input by a Petri net-modeled system. The
petri net has 2 sets of transitions: observable and unobservable actions, and a set of
secret marking subsequently representing the states judged to be secret in the LTS. We
add in line 3 a Stack, namely CounterExample with all the standard functions (push,
pop and top), whose elements are quadruples composed by the counter-examples, a
transition t, an actual aggregate a and an aggregate a′, successor of a by t. Then,
the algorithm 1 starts by constructing (line 6) the reachability graph which represents
the LTS. Once other changes have been made (i.e. line 10 & 29), when the opacity is
violated, neither the verification nor the construction of the SOG stops. All the paths
leading to the disclosure of privacy are stacked into CounterExample. Once all nodes
are explored and the SOG construction is finished, and if the stack is not empty we
proceed to opacification.
5.2 The Opacification Proposed Algorithm
The opacification algorithm has a pretty straightforward mechanism. It begins by com-
puting the minimal super-language ( Theorem 1). The next step consists in recuperating
(line 4) the first elements of the stack (CounterExample). Next, the algorithm goes
through the foreach loop which takes each word of the calculated super-language. If
such a word is equivalent with the trace recuperated from the stack, then we proceed
to opacify the SOG. We begin by creating (line 8) a new state qnew that we will add
(line 9) into the aggregate a′. At line 11, we pass to opacify the LTS. We retrieve the
last state q included in the aggregate a′. A new unobservable transition tnew will be
created. Then, the algorithm inserts (line 13) the new state qnew to the LTS states,
adds (line 14) the new transition tnew to the set of unobservable events Σu, and defines
the transition function between q, tnew and qnew. Starting from line 16, the algorithm
performs the Petri net opacification by creating, at first a new place pnew and adding it
to the set of places. It also adds the transition tnew to the set of transitions. To specify
the flow relation between p, tnew and pnew, the algorithm adds an arc for each relation
and assigns to each arc a weight. Afterwards, it modifies the incidence matrix. Finally,
the algorithm pops the stack and restarts the operations until the final emptying of
the stack presenting the ending test of the while loop.
Being a particular type of Petri nets, oWF-nets require different method of opacifi-
cation. When fetching the place p (the execution of getP lace), we have to exclude the
output places. Furthermore, oWF-nets require only one final place po. So, following
the addition of the unobservable transition tnew, we must escape adding the new place.
And a flow relation will be added between tnew and po. Other specific case that may be
necessary, when the place returned by getP lace is a destination place, we require fur-
ther changes on the oWF-net. The first step is to retrieve the transition that following
its crossing marked the output place. Step two is to delete the flow relation between t
and po. The following step is to create a new place pnew and to add the unobservable
transition tnew. Then, we create the flow relations between t, pnew, tnew and po.
5.3 Case Study Opacification
Through the case study presented earlier, we will show the practical use of our ap-
proach. In this section, we will describe the changes we are making to render the CPr
workflow opaque.
Conducting the opacity verification, we noted that the CPr workflow is not opaque
and the algorithm 1 returned two counterexamples: CounterExample = {(T7T13T19T18,
{S13, S18}, T18, {S22}), (T7T13T16T21, {S14, S19}, T21, {S23})}.
As the opacification algorithm starts by computing the minimal super-language, the
function ComputationMinSL returns the following result:
minSl = {T7T13T19T18, T7T13T16T21}.
The next step of our opacification approach is to bring the necessary modifications
to the SOG and then we return to the LTS and to the Petri-net. To treat the first opacity
violation for the CPr, the algorithm 2 starts by creating a new state qnew = S27. This
is added to the aggregate that contains S22. Then, a new unobservable transition is
created (tnew = T22) and the relation between S22, T22 and S27 is defined. The final
step is the opacification of the oWF-net. To do this, we applied the specific case of
algorithm 2. We start first by removing the flow relation (T21Po). Thereafter, we add
the place P17. Finally, we add flow relations: F ← F ∪ (T21, P17), F ← F ∪ (P17, T22)
et F ← F ∪ (T22, Po).
The changes made to render the CPr workflow opaque are depicted in Figure 3.
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(a) SOG
T22
T23
S27
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(b) LTS
(c) oWF-net
Fig. 3. The CPr workflow opacification
6 Conclusion & Perspectives
In this paper, we used opacity, a generalization of many security properties, as a means
to track the information flow in an IoT-based medical application. We introduced a
model to analyze the behavior of an IoT-based heart attack detection system discussing
how an observer may infer personal patient information. Our work aims at detecting
security leaks in our system, using SOG-based algorithms for the on-the-fly verification
of opacity variants (simple, K-step weak, and K-step strong opacity). We have also
proposed a novel, SOG-based approach for opacity enforcement of Petri net-modeled
systems. The main contribution of this work is to propose an efficient algorithm for
enforcing simple opacity by padding the system with minimal dummy behavior. In our
future research, we will explore the same idea of enforcement for other opacity variants
such as K-step weak and K-step strong opacity. Furthermore, we also hope to extend
this work to take into account different types of enforcement, such as supervisory
control for opacity and finding the supremal sub-language, instead of computing the
minimal super-language.
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